November-December 2024 TWP Newsletter - Holiday edition
Bringing you the latest news and updates on all things TWP!
Dear Friends and fellow travellers on all things TWP,
Welcome to our November- December (end of year) TWP CoP Newsletter. This is our Holiday Edition, and as always it is filled with lots of exciting content.
Before you do anything else,
Please take two minutes to complete our survey. We would love to hear what you think about the TWP Community of Practice and how we can be as useful a resource as possible to all those navigating in this space. Thank you for your time and feedback!
Here is a summary of what we have in store in this edition of the newsletter:
In our featured interview, we speak with Marta Ruedas, a veteran of the United Nations, and ask her to share insights about her experience in seeking to think and work in politically aware ways across a variety of countries and settings.
In the “What we are Working on” section, you will find information about:
A new paper by Nicola Nixon, Leni Wild, Sumaya Saluja, and Adam Burke that the TWP CoP has published in collaboration with The Asia Foundation (TAF) and Global Governance Partners (GPG). The paper, titled “Ripple effects: politicians and the political economy of international development”, builds on the “Conversation on Politics, Development and Change” that we organised jointly in April 2024 .
An exciting upcoming TWP event on “Monitoring and Evaluation for Thinking and Working Politically”, a fish bowl discussion which will be facilitated by Florencia Guerzovich and Tom Aston. Make sure to register now!
A short piece highlighting insights from an event on the political economy of the energy transition in the Global South that ECDPM and The Policy Practice organised in October in Brussels in collaboration with the World Bank and the TWP CoP. The article also includes embedded videos of a few participants sharing soundbites from the event, which you can watch.
In “What we are reading”, Simon Maxwell writes an in-depth review of Mark Lowcock and Ranil Dissanayake’s recently published book on “The Rise and Fall of DFID”.
As always, we also bring you the latest publications, events, resources and other news of interest from a TWP perspective.
Last but not least, the TWP CoP now has a new page on Bluesky. Follow us for updates on what we are working on!
If there is anything you would like to share with us, including items for future newsletters, please get in touch by email at: info@twpcommunity.org. And please share with your network, and subscribe if you haven’t already!
Oh and please remember: If you are able to, it is better to open the newsletter directly on your browser (click on the ‘TWP CoP November - December 2024 Newsletter’ header, at the top of this page) so that you can get full access to all our content.
With best wishes,
Alina & Graham
Highlight feature
Marta Ruedas in conversation with Alina Rocha Menocal
Drawing on her thirty year+ career at the UN before retiring in 2020, Marta Ruedas shares her thoughts on why thinking about politics and working differently on the ground has been important at both a personal and an organisational level, and what difference it has made.
Marta has extensive experience coordinating UN development and humanitarian work in conflict and post-conflict countries, as well as supporting peacebuilding transitions. Her last position was as Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) as well as United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq.
Since 2020, Marta has continued to focus on the intersection of the political, humanitarian and development spheres from a politically informed perspective. She is now a consultant at the UN, and is Senior Advisor to the mediation-focused NGO CITpax based in Madrid, Spain.
Watch the conversation here:
Or alternatively, listen to the podcast version here.
What we are working on
1. New TWP CoP Publication
We are thrilled to announce the publication of “Ripple Effects: Politicians and the Political Economy of International Development”, a new paper by Nicola Nixon, Leni Wild, Sumaya Saluja and Adam Burke. Building on a ‘conversation on politics, development and change’ webinar that GPG and TAF convened in collaboration with the TWP CoP in April 2024, this paper draws on the insights and reflections that three current and former politicians shared during that discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the dynamic interactions between politicians and representatives of donor agencies.
You can read the full paper here.
2. New event in our Global Webinar Series
Monitoring and Evaluating in Thinking and Working Politically, Wednesday 11 December 2024, 10:00am EST/15:00pm GMT
How can we tell if efforts to promote change through politically informed approaches are working?
Join the conversation, facilitated by monitoring and evaluation experts Florencia Guerzovich and Tom Aston, as we reflect on how those engaged in TWP efforts go about monitoring and evaluating such initiatives in ways that appreciate the complexities involved.
The discussion will address the following questions:
In practice, what kinds of stories are development practitioners telling about the difference TWP can make in helping to, among other things, analyse contexts, identify entry points, prioritise engagement, and use that knowledge to manage relationships and/or foster coalitions for change?
How are practitioners using those insights to do their work better and mainstream TWP principles within their own organisations and in their engagement with other partners?
For more information about the event, please visit the events’ page on the TWP CoP website here.
3. The Political Economy of the Energy Transition in the Global South - Building a network
Reflections from an event organised by ECDPM and TPP in collaboration with the World Bank and the TWP CoP in Brussels on 9 October 2024
By Alfonso Medinilla (ECDPM), Bruce Byiers (ECDPM), and Neil McCulloch (TPP) with embedded videos featuring Poorva Karkare (ECDPM), Neil McCulloch (TPP), Sheila Oparaocha (ENERGIA), and Verena Fritz (World Bank)
Why is the Green Energy Transition so challenging in the Global South?
While the need for a transition away from fossil fuels to renewable energy is widely acknowledged, the rate at which this is currently happening is slower than that required to keep global temperatures below the targets in the Paris Agreement, or to achieve UN Sustainable Development Goal 7 of ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
Countries in the Global South face a particularly acute challenge—they find themselves having to balance growing energy needs to meet industrialisation and economic transformation objectives, with the international push to transition away from fossil fuels. Reform programmes and external support often fall short of objectives. In large part, this is because they often fail to take explicit account of the political realities that shape the behaviour of those actors with a key role in the green energy transition - whether as champions or blockers.
That was the starting point for a gathering convened by ECDPM and The Policy Practice in Brussels in collaboration with the World Bank and the Thinking and Working Politically Community of Practice on October 9, 2024. The hybrid event brought together a group of climate, energy and governance experts and practitioners to discuss the politics of the energy transition, explore how political economy analysis and related tools can be used to nudge incentives of key actors with a role in the energy transition, and to help to identify politically feasible pathways towards a green energy transition in countries in the Global South.
[Video: Poorva Karkare talks about what is missing in the current conversations on the Energy Transition. Watch here]
The event sought to bring together communities in the governance-climate nexus to encourage greater cross-fertilisation across these two sectors, share experiences, tease out lessons, and think about what to do next. As part of that, the event also aimed to kickstart a network of interested researchers, practitioners and policymakers as a means to better connect technical, financial, and political economy expertise around the energy transition in developing countries.
Below we highlight a few reflections on key factors affecting the energy transition that emerged from the conversation.
The politics of energy transition
As one of the participants in the event put it, “if politics weren’t an issue, renewables would be the winner on price alone”.
The simple technical case for having energy systems dominated by renewable energy is clear, with solar and wind prices undercutting most other forms of energy globally. But at the same time, entrenched interests, market dynamics, and social and spatial disparities often slow down the uptake of these technologies. Expanding renewable energy is a wicked problem—it is not only technically complex but also logistically difficult, and it can be economically expensive (despite falling prices). It is politically sensitive, touching on a range of often conflicting or entrenched interests and incentives. This is why effective energy transition programmes and initiatives also need to be politically smart.
[Video: Neil McCulloch highlights how political economy analysis and thinking and working politically can help understand constraints affecting the energy transition and spot potential windows of opportunity. Watch here]
Drivers of energy reforms
Another point that came out clearly from the meeting is that the drivers for energy reform (or lack thereof) can be very different, and understanding what these are in different contexts is essential. For some countries, energy sovereignty and self-sufficiency is paramount. This can be a hook to develop renewables (e.g., hydropower in Ethiopia). In other cases, however, a high renewable scenario is seen as a risk, as it can create new dependencies on neighbouring countries. In yet others, like India, the negative effects of fossil fuels, such as air pollution, provide more of an incentive to transition to cleaner alternatives, including electric vehicles (EVs) or coal phaseout, than climate and energy costs.
Fossil fuel endowments
Endowments matter, but this also plays out in different ways. Fossil fuel endowments are essential for government revenues for most countries, thus creating path dependency. In some cases, like coal in Colombia and South Africa, fossil fuels are also deeply linked to social stability and internal security making a transition out of these sectors a political and societal risk. Or they can be deeply embedded in state- and nation-building processes, like oil in Mexico. Renewable energy potential in some countries, like Morocco and Namibia, in turn, is used to promote new green investments in energy-intensive industries and hydrogen production, which can facilitate a "renewables pull."
Power markets
Solar and wind energy, on paper, can undercut most other forms of electricity production. However, energy prices are often heavily distorted for many reasons, including fossil fuel subsidies, inefficiencies in generation and transmission, and politically motivated tariff setting (including cross-subsidisation). These price distortions can reinforce political and economic dependencies on fossil fuel industries (as in the case of Mexico), or decrease the commercial viability of green energy projects, complicating the transition to renewables.
Pathways of change
The challenge is not only to understand the drivers and blockers of energy transition but also engage with these dynamics and try to identify plausible pathways of change that can alter the underlying conditions. A normative (emissions) or technical (optimisation) starting point may not always be the most appropriate. In some cases, it may be more useful to graft energy transition onto economic transformation and industrialisation agendas (e.g., energy-intensive industries) or to emphasise how the energy transition can be part of a pro-poor development strategy. In others, the key to energy transition may be altering rent dynamics, working with a new generation of ‘solar barons’ who see a way to corner the renewables market. This may not be ideal, but might be “good enough”, at least for the short term.
Gender and social justice
Gender and social justice may also offer important entry points for harnessing an energy transition. There are examples from women’s empowerment network from ENERGIA of how they are applying a political economy lens to advocacy efforts towards an energy transition that is gender just and inclusive.
[Video: Sheila Oparaocha tells us how the Network’s political economy lens is helping Kenya work towards a Gender Just and Inclusive Energy Transition. Watch here]
Among other things, this approach has entailed:
Building a women’s collective agency for women to come together, identify their needs, and explore how they can influence the energy transition so that resulting policies are gender inclusive and committed to social justice.
Identifying powerful actors in energy transition to bridge the gap between policy and implementation, and engaging with them from an operational side to integrate gender in energy transition policy more systematically.
Kenya was the first country to launch a gender and energy policy, an achievement that ENERGIA contributed to through its politically informed approach to advocacy.
Finding efficiency within an inefficient system—working politically.
Political economy analysis can help reframe problems, identify opportunities, and shape narratives. The real challenge, however, is to move from analysis to practice. One of the difficulties practitioners face is that, very often, studies spell out blockages but do not offer ways to address them. What came out very clearly from the conversation in Brussels is that funders and project developers are not naive. When given the space and the means, they will work politically, tackle disincentives, and take flanking measures to help nudge incentives for renewable energy investments and to enable projects to thrive. Yet this is not always built into the design or operating manual for green energy projects.
Towards a more effective approach to the energy transition
Unifying factors for a more effective political economy approach to the energy transition appear to be threefold:
Time and flexibility: Sustained engagement, across projects, allowing for the alteration of conditions for energy investments and the tackling of commercial and policy barriers, which may have very different timelines, as well as the ability to adjust projects to take account of contextual shifts over time.
Problem-driven: Energy transition is an iterative process. It requires thinking about systems change but also identifying and addressing specific problems that can be used to drive momentum.
Trust: Building trust between actors—including governments, utilities, private investors, and communities—is crucial.
Building a network of experts
[Video: Verena Fritz highlights why it is important to have a political economy perspective in the Energy Transition. Watch here]
The event was a unique opportunity to learn from funders, project developers, energy regulators, and policy analysts working across the climate and governance sectors, all of whom have to navigate political economy factors in different ways on an ongoing basis. Participants expressed a clear desire to develop and maintain a network to continue such exchanges, foster collaboration, and bridge the gap between technical solutions and politically informed insights and approaches.
The idea of a network would be to provide a space for researchers, practitioners and policymakers to share experiences and lessons of thinking and working politically on the green transition in the Global South and to find sources of support and advice. If suitable funding can be secured, bringing this kind of network to life might include one or more of the following (and other?) activities and ideas:
A regular series of online webinars covering different topics or aspects of the political economy of the green transition in a variety of contexts.
Further, in-person and/or virtual, workshops on the political economy of the green transition, including ones with a regional or country focus for example.
A workshop at the World Bank, bringing together key practitioners in the US working on the green transition
A repository of key papers and reports on the political economy of the green transition in the Global South (which could be done through creating a dedicated space for this in existing platforms, including TPP’s online library)
An open-access contacts database of experts working in the field.
These ideas are all work in progress, and we would love to hear from you if you are interested in joining the network or would like more information about it. Please do get in touch with us at <info@twpcommunity.org>.
What we are reading
Lowcock, M., and Dissanayake, R. (2024). The Rise and Fall of the Department for International Development. Centre for Global Development.
A review by Simon Maxwell
Mark Lowcock and Ranil Dissanayake (henceforth M&R) have written a history of DFID [the former UK Department for International Development] from 1997 to the first days of the Starmer Government in 2024. They are both DFID veterans: Mark, of course, rising to be Permanent Secretary; and Ranil as an economic adviser. Theirs is a history marked by nostalgia for the golden age after 1997, as well as despair, or even almost bitterness, about the damage done to the Department after 2016. There is also an optimistic message, however, especially about the value of aid.
The book ends with four lessons, relevant to both the UK and other donors in international development and global affairs. These are about long-term vision, building an organisation to deliver the vision, generous funding, and partnerships. Two questions then arise. Is the history right? And are the lessons the right ones to draw, for the UK and others?
A personal note
We will get to those, but first a personal note to provide context for what follows. I have been at this for a long time: as an economist on a UK aid project in Bolivia in the 1970s; founding member of the Independent Group on British Aid (IGBA), which launched the poverty-focused concept of Real Aid in 1982; unofficial and occasional advisor to ministers and shadow ministers from the mid-1990s; Director of ODI from 1997 to 2009; Specialist Adviser to the International Development Committee of the House of Commons from 2011-2017; and, of course, someone with a research interest in the topic.
The argument
Anyway, on to the book. There are four chronological sections, covering: (a) the Clare Short years from 1997-2003; (b) the remaining Labour years to 2010; (c) the coalition years to 2015 and through to 2016; and (d) “The Fall”, 2016 to the present day. The history is interspersed throughout with discussion of and data on development trends (which I’m afraid I skipped). What do we learn?
Part I covers the decision to create DFID, the strengthening of the Department, various aid and non-aid initiatives, and, especially, the role that Clare Short and her team played in embedding the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in the UK and internationally. The last chapter in this section offers a verdict on the Clare Short years: “The capability, reputation, culture and effectiveness of the department . . . strengthened substantially in these years”. In the authors’ rendering, Clare Short’s leadership did not quite achieve this on her own – Tony Blair and Gordon Brown are allowed a part. If, as M&R argue, “the most important test of leaders is what is retained from what they did years after they have moved on”, then this period is also a testament to their effective leadership.
Part II describes DFID’s growing concern for conflict, state fragility, insecurity, corruption and governance. It notes the increasing budget, lists a series of administrative reforms, and celebrates the level of decentralisation which gave DFID country managers more leeway than most other aid counterparts. A key feature during this period is the growth of cross-party consensus on aid. And of course, these were the years of the Africa Commission, of pressure for debt relief, of Make Poverty History, and of the Gleneagles Summit. Importantly, development survived as a UK priority during the financial crisis from 2008: this alone justifies a positive scorecard for the Department at the end of a decade marked by austerity measures implemented by the UK Government.
Part III covers the Coalition years and the Conservative Government up to the Brexit vote in 2016. The development problem was “getting more complicated”, M&R write: climate change was growing in importance, while humanitarian relief, linked both to environmental crises and conflict, was absorbing an ever-larger share of the budget. Cameron himself led global work to design the (ultimately over-loaded, in their view) Sustainable Development Goals as the successors to the MDGs. During this time too, 0.7 became law. But Andrew Mitchell (Secretary of State from 2010-12) and his successors noted that support for development spending was shallow, and invested in value-for-money, a focus on results and independent evaluation of aid impact. This, M&R conclude, “failed to head off the right-wing critics. They were technical and evidentiary responses to what was ultimately a political problem”.
Part IV covers a period of “chaos . . . political turmoil and policy confusion”. M&R lament the erosion of the commitment to poverty by successive ministers from 2016 onwards. “To the extent”, they say, “that [the political leadership of DFID] had any policy agenda at all on development, the Government’s narrative focused in an increasingly transactional way on a few issues – especially health, education, humanitarian response, and help for women and girls”. There was also “a deluded desire to pretend that Britain mattered more, and had greater influence on the world stage, than it did”. And then, of course, in 2019, DFID was merged with the Foreign Office to create the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO), and aid was cut from 0.7 to 0.5 percent of GDP. In subsequent years, there were cuts to the aid budget that got increasingly more severe: “Ministers presided over the destruction of much of DFID’s capability to manage development policy and programming, and a tarnishing of the UK’s international reputation”. Oh, dear.
To the lessons. As noted, there are four. First, a long-term vision, backed up with clear objectives and a persuasive theory of change. M&R argue that the MDGs offered this, while the SDGs do not. Second, building an organisation to deliver the vision, distinguished by strong leadership, a coherent culture, effective systems and processes, and of course good people. Third, generous resourcing. And fourth, strong partnerships, across Whitehall and internationally.
Is the history right?
So, is the history right? The book covers a lot of ground and is based on many interviews. It offers a passionate, evidence-based and welcome defence of development cooperation.
There is one regret, which is that M&R do not seem to have interviewed any of the Advisers or SPADs who worked for ministers or shadow ministers during the period. David Mepham would have been a particularly valuable source, given his experience with Clare Short and her predecessors before 1997. Sadly, David died in 2018. One anecdote of his, though, is that he had to rewrite the opening chapter of the 1997 White Paper pretty well from scratch, because the civil servants didn’t get it. I wish we could ask him to say more about that. The many others who served deserve recognition. One of them, Stephen Doughty, is now a Minister himself.
There is an immense amount of detail in the book, bringing to mind debates which energised us as researchers at different stages. Can poverty reasonably be defined in money terms? How can donor countries be held accountable for the quality of their partnership with poor countries? Is budget support a good idea? Does aid actually work? Is the focus on results the rabbit hole it often appears to be? What can be done in fragile states? There is also a discussion to have over drinks one day about how different ministers and senior civil servants are ranked.
Let me just make a few points.
1) Yes, DFID was excellent in the 2000s, but I am not convinced that was mainly the result of creating a new Department. Clare Short asked me to write her a paper before the 1997 election on whether a separate Department was a good idea. Annoyingly, I can’t find it. But I concluded that there were arguments on both sides, and that the decision was a bit of a toss-up. Clare said that the big advantage of being a Cabinet Minister was that she would be able to button-hole Gordon Brown while waiting to go into Cabinet or while sitting next to him on the front bench in the House of Commons. There was also an argument that you would have a better minister if they were in the Cabinet. That is a theory some would say has been tested in recent years.
People from other countries often asked me about the UK model. I would reply that, compared with other countries, usually with fragmented aid and development architectures, even the predecessor Overseas Development Administration (ODA) offered advantages compared to other systems: responsibility for aid policy as well as implementation; for development aid as well as humanitarian aid; for both financial and technical assistance; and with strong engagement with the Bretton Woods institutions and other multilaterals.
What is the DFID counterfactual? It is worth asking what the UK development offer would have been in the 2000s if ODA had been retained and strengthened, with Clare Short at the helm and more money to spend.
More recently, the merger has obviously created many problems, and many good people have left. On the other hand, I set nine tests for a successful merger, and most of those have been met. They were: Commit to 0.7; Retain poverty focus; Adhere to DAC rules; DFID (= development) membership of Cabinet, National Security Council; Own Permanent Secretary; Own staff including 700+ professional advisers; Own Select Committee; A voice on non-aid matters; and Retain ICAI.
The big failure is 0.7, with M&R clear about the cost of cutting aid and diverting resources to support refugees and asylum seekers in the UK. There should also be special stress on protecting (or perhaps now rebuilding) the professional cadres, which was/is definitely a UK comparative advantage. Whether this is done within FCDO or by returning to a dedicated Department of State, as M&R recommend, can be considered a second order question.
2) Clare Short deserves a lot of credit for re-energising the aid programme and for pushing the MDGs at a critical time. It is also true, as M&R note, that she was often impatient with NGOs and (some) academics. I can think of at least one good anecdote of my own to that effect, which caused me a great deal of anguish and some difficulty as Director of ODI. The MDGs were characterised by time-bound targets (e.g. halve poverty by 2015). But there was quite a push-back agains targets in the early years of the Blair Government, and the MDGs raised similar problems of oversimplification and perverse incentives. Adrian Wood, when Chief Economist at DFID, used to say that it was important to “take the MDGs seriously, but not literally”. But I have said in public since that Clare Short was right to foreground the target-based approach of the MDGs, and I may have been wrong to nit-pick. The Christmas tree SDGs are another matter . . .
It is also important, though, to give even more credit than M&R allow to Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. M&R are quite grudging about Blair, in particular. But the progress made in the 2000s would not have been possible, for example at Gleneagles, without top-level leadership focus on high-level strategy. Why, one wonders, did No. 10 often describe DFID as the “big NGO down the road”? Why did one Permanent Secretary once complain that “there are not enough good people in DFID” to send around Whitehall? And why did one (Labour) DFID minister lament that DFID had too much body and not enough brain?
3) M&R are sceptical about what they describe as the “toothless” act to legislate for 0.7. I’m not sure about that, but maybe that is just because I was one of those advocating for it. It reflected a long debate through the 2000s and later about how to protect the level of aid. The commitment to 0.7 played an important part in the effort to build cross-party consensus: indeed, the commitment became a competitive issue between the parties. Yes, the commitment was abandoned when it became politically unpalatable – but the least that can be said is that having the commitment in place raised the embarrassment threshold when it was abandoned.
4) While the book has quite a lot to say about non-aid issues, arguably it does not say nearly enough. From the perspective of 2024, it is possible to make the case that non-aid issues are much more important than aid (with the exception of humanitarian relief as well climate finance, which many people do not think counts as aid at all). But the IGBA Report Aid is Not Enough was published in 1984, and of course many development experts worked on trade, finance, peace-building, migration and other non-aid issues both before and after. By the early 2000s, Inge Kaul’s book on Global Public Goods (published in 1999, not referenced in M&R) had helped reshape the development debate. By the middle of the decade, I was writing about the different development cooperation needs of the 20% Club, consisting of countries that were aid dependent, and the 0.2% Club, comprising countries that were not. A decade later, the International Development Committee wrote a major report on Beyond Aid. By then, climate change (finally) worked its way to the top of the agenda, with Rory Stewart describing the issue as a ‘cataclysm’ that had to be front and centre in development work. Here is a conclusion for M&R: a test of the effectiveness of a development agency is how well it shapes national policy on non-aid issues.
5) M&R hint at the importance of multilateralism but do not fully explore it – in terms of either aid spending or policy. M&R note in their chapter on the 2000s that “multilateral agencies are often effective but rarely efficient”, and they mention but do not discuss Andrew Mitchell’s Multilateral Aid Review. They do not analyse the reasons or consequences of the deep cultural affinity between senior DFID officials and the World Bank, often the default recipient of DFID resources. The EU deserves a chapter of its own in a history of DFID, and so do efforts to improve the performance of the UN. The materials in my cupboard are eloquent on both. I was writing in the mid-2000s about the competences required in DFID to deal with the multilaterals (‘Spyglass, Spigot, Spoon or Spanner’). M&R are also dismissive of the Douglas Alexander White Paper in 2009, which committed to putting a higher proportion of new resources into multilateral agencies, to support reform.
6) Finally, I think it is important to recognise that DFID, wonderful as it was etc . . .etc . . . before the fall, was also sometimes seen as over-reaching. The DAC Peer Review of the UK in 2014 had many positive things to say about DFID, but it also made the point, politely, that DFID was gummed up by targets, procedures and transactions costs, and had become (my words not M&R’s) a bit of a global bully. With respect to humanitarian aid, the Review noted that “there is a fine line between ensuring UK priorities are implemented, and listening to, and respecting, the positions of others on the global stage”. It also argued that “the UK needs to manage the risk that its focus on reporting to domestic audiences weakens its engagement on mutual accountability”.
Lessons for the future
How about the lessons for the future? In thinking about these, I reflect on the above, but also draw on two recent books: On Leadership: Lessons for the 21st Century by Tony Blair, and Failed State: Why Nothing Works and How We Fix it by Sam Freedman. The former reinforces the M&R point about vision and leadership. The latter picks up a number of points made in M&R, not least the negative impact of a high turnover of ministers. Just four points.
1) A key conclusion is that aid matters and that it works for the most part. But I would suggest that this is not entirely dependent on organisational configuration, even if it is closely linked to it. Aid can make an important difference because of need. As the November 2024 G20 communique concluded recently: “With only six years left to achieve the …SDGs…, progress towards only 17% of the SDG targets is on track, nearly half are showing minimal or moderate progress, and progress on over one third has stalled or even regressed”. So (more) aid is needed to meet the ambitions of the SDGs.
Clearly, aid is not the only answer to faltering progress, and attribution is sometimes difficult, but M&R make the case convincingly that cutting aid hinders development. In this context, diverting aid destined for developing countries to pay for costs of housing refugees and asylum seekers, in the UK and elsewhere, can have strongly negative consequences. Total ODA spent on hosting refugees in donor countries in 2023 was $US 29 bn, with 11 out of 28 DAC members allocating more than 15% of “aid” towards that.
2) The conversation about what “development” means today is not over. The framing of Andrew Mitchell’s 2023 White Paper was pretty good. Remember it had seven over-arching themes:
Going further, faster to mobilise international finance to end extreme poverty, tackle climate change and biodiversity loss, power sustainable growth and increase private sector investment in development.
Strengthening and reforming the international system to improve action on trade, tax, debt, tackling dirty money and corruption, and delivering on global challenges like health, climate, nature and energy transition.
Harnessing innovation and new technologies, science and research for the greatest and most cost-effective development impact.
Ensuring opportunities for all, putting women and girls centre stage and investing in education and health systems that societies want.
Championing action to address state fragility, and to anticipate and prevent conflict, humanitarian crises, climate disasters and threats to global health.
Building resilience and enabling adaptation for those affected by conflict, disasters and climate change, strengthening food security, social protection, disaster risk financing and building state capability.
Standing up for open inclusive societies, for women and girls, and for the protection of rights and against their roll-back.
The White Paper was less good on the implementation side. As I commented at the time: “The White Paper . . . does a pretty good job of diagnosis and with respect to a guiding policy. There are lots – lots – of actions, presumably coherent. What is not clear to me, though, is what choices have been made. . .. There are lots of 'we wills', which is fine, but I would love to see a list of 'we won'ts'“.
Which Government globally has done better? And will the new Labour Government feel the need to produce its own White Paper?
3) It goes without saying that the world order is exceptionally fragile, with consequences that range across development preoccupations, from conflict to trade, from democratic backsliding to organised crime, and from migration to climate change. In this context, development cooperation cannot just be about aid, but has to be about rebuilding the global order. Building on the lessons of collective action theory, development has to be about creating a culture of collaboration, about incentives and disincentives, and about strengthening global institutions. A tall order at least for the UK, less powerful and less well-connected than it was in 1997, and likely to face major international disruption in the coming years. Development strategy needs to start with an analysis of this question.
4) Whatever the organisational configuration, this job cannot be done by development specialists alone. The development challenge now is cross-sectoral, cross-disciplinary, cross-border, and cross-instrument. Having a development voice at the heart of international policymaking is essential. My view? An FCDO is better suited to this than a separate FCO and DFID. The priority is to make FCDO as good as it can possibly be.
Bulletin Board
1. Courses and Training Opportunities
Political Economy Analysis in Action online training course, The Policy Practice and ODI (3 February to 5 June 2025)
This flagship course aims to equip participants with the tools and confidence to undertake political economy analysis, and to apply the analysis to policy and programmes in a wide range of contexts. Eight sessions over a 17-week period require about four hours of study per week (with a mix of self-study, online Study Group discussions and tasks and webinars, supported by an interactive platform). Participants can apply online here by 30 November 2024 to take advantage of our Early Bird offer.
Political Economy Analysis for Climate Action online course, The Policy Practice (May 2025)
Based on the TPP-ODI flagship course, this shorter course focuses on how PEA can maximise the effectiveness of action on climate change. Eight interactive two-hour sessions are spread over four weeks. Participants can register their interest here.
2. Calls for papers
The Behavioural Science and Policy (BSP) journal is inviting submissions for papers for a special issue on “Understanding and Countering Disinformation and Propaganda” to enhance both scholarly understanding of and policy measures to counteract disinformation and propaganda. Interested authors are encouraged to submit their abstracts by 31 December 2024. Visit this link for more information.
The European Consortium for Political Research is hosting a General Conference on 26-29 August 2025 at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. The conference provides a global stage that nurtures the development of research across all sub-disciplines of political science. Proposals for papers and panels are due on 6 January 2025. Visit this link for more information.
Recent Publications
1. Academic and policy-oriented publications
Acemoglu, D., Aksoy, C. G., Baysan, C. M., and Zeki, G. (2024). Misperceptions and Demand for Democracy under Authoritarianism. NBER National Bureau of Economic Research.
This paper investigates whether enduring authoritarian regimes are in part rooted in the population’s misperceptions about their social and economic costs—as opposed to a general preference for authoritarianism. The authors (Daron Acemoglu has just received the Nobel Prize for Economics alongside James Robinson and Simon Johnson) for their work on institutions) explore this question using online and field experiments in the context of Turkey’s May 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections. They confirm that voters, especially those supporting the incumbent authoritarian government, systematically underestimate the extent to which democracy and media freedom have been eroded in Turkey and their usefulness in dealing with natural disasters and corruption (two salient issues in Turkey). The evidence suggests that at least part of the support for authoritarian regimes may be coming from misperceptions about their institutions and policies, and may be more malleable than typically presumed.
Asafu-Adjaye, P. and Rizzo, M. (2024). Going entrepreneurial: the dark side of donors and trade union support to informal workers in Accra, Ghana. Merlin Press.
This article analyses donor-funded aid programmes to support trade unions in the informal street food sector in Accra. It reviews the programmes that this aid entailed, against the backdrop of socioeconomic stratification in the sector. The article reviews the achievements and blind spots of such initiatives and underlines the disconnect between donors’ aid and the reality on the ground. It argues that this is rooted in the market fundamentalist notion of the informal economy that such aid promotes, with its focus on small-scale enterprises.
Bain, K. and Florez, J. (2024). Making the energy transition in Colombia a just one: A political economy analysis and collective ideas for action. Governance Action Hub, Results for Development.
This paper outlines the Governance Action Hub’s analysis on Colombia to date, summarising findings from two initial stages of exploration: identifying feasible entry points and ground testing a working hypothesis around supporting the comunidades energéticas (energy communities) to promote better access to affordable and reliable energy, and, ultimately, improved local development outcomes and democratic resilience.
Corrales, J. and Freeman, W. (2024). How Organized Crime Threatens Latin America. Journal of Democracy 35(4).
Organised crime has emerged as the most important security threat to democratic governance in Latin America. This essay explains why Latin American democracies have been able to curb other security threats (from the military, insurgents, and oligopolists) but are struggling to contain organised crime. Organised crime possesses power assets associated with traditional security threats (military capacity, territorial control, and access to markets). But it also operates innovatively: it infiltrates and co-opts the state, which makes it difficult for presidents to rely on state institutions (such as the police, the army, the courts, and prisons) to act in a unified way to fight organised crime. The article concludes with some recommendations for governments to stop organised crime from capturing parts of the state and eroding democratic governance.
Da Ros, L. and Gehrke, M. (2024). Convicting Politicians for Corruption: The Politics of Criminal Accountability. Government and Opposition 59(3).
Why are politicians more likely to be prosecuted and convicted for corruption in some contexts than in others? This review organises current explanations along three levels of inquiry: (1) micro, encompassing characteristics of individual criminal-accountability agents and defendants, such as their partisanship and ideology, professional ethos, enforcement costs and judicial corruption; (2) meso, emphasising the independence, capacities and coordination degrees of criminal-accountability institutions; and (3) macro, including the impact of political regimes, political competition, support from civil society, corruption levels and international norms.
Gethin, A., Martinez-Toledano, C., and Piketty, T. (2021). Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948–2020. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(1).
This article sheds new light on the long-run evolution of political cleavages in 21 Western democracies. The authors exploit a new database on the socioeconomic determinants of the vote, covering more than 300 elections held between 1948 and 2020. In the 1950s and 1960s, the vote for social democratic, socialist, and affiliated parties was associated with lower-educated and low-income voters. It has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, giving rise in the 2010s to a disconnect between the effects of income and education on the vote: higher-educated voters now vote for the “left”, while high-income voters continue to vote for the “right”. This transition has been accelerated by the rise of green and anti-immigration movements, whose distinctive feature is to concentrate the votes of the higher-educated and lower-educated electorates. The authors provide evidence that the reversal of the education cleavage is strongly linked to the emergence of a new “sociocultural” axis of political conflict.
Glencorse, B,. and Jarvis, M. (2024). The role of civil society oversight and social accountability in climate finance and action. Trust Accountability and Inclusion Collaborative (TAI).
In this paper, the authors consider the roles that civil society can and must play in promoting accountability of climate finance. They outline the current state of play and consider actions that can be taken at multiple levels- from the local to the national to the global, drawing on practical examples. The paper also points to the need for more resourcing for civil society to be an effective partner in mitigating integrity risks.
Gubser, M. (2025). Their Future: A History of Ahistoricism in International Development. Yale University Press.
In this book, Michael Gubser chronicles the varieties of ahistoricism in international development theory and practice since 1945. He traces the history of development ideas, analysing key theoretical and policy statements to highlight the marginalisation of history in favor of technical solutions to economic and social problems; and he examines aid programmes in several developing countries to show how Western models of social and economic development have been applied and misapplied.
Guerzovich, F., and Aston, T. (2024). Layering Social Accountability Interventions to Strengthen Local Education Systems. World Vision.
Strengthening education systems is a challenging endeavour, especially when partial decentralisation has co-existed with a plethora of short-term reforms and persistently low-quality results. This is the case of the Dominican Republic, where this evaluation traces the gradual contributions of what appear to be fragmented social accountability interventions to systems strengthening. The authors’ main finding is that it is possible for different stakeholders working toward a common objective of systems strengthening to layer short-term reform efforts on top of each other and in so doing bring new functionality. Layering can dynamise, stretch, and provide new meaning to existing components of a local education system, whether at school or policy levels. Interactions and the relational infrastructure that underpins them help to uncover the conditions under which the whole adds to more than the sum of the individual interventions in strengthening the local education system. This finding has important implications for evaluating and learning about relational and intertemporal system-strengthening efforts
Ha, H., Knox, C., and Janenova, S. (2024). Authoritarian and democratic states: the COVID-19 pandemic and the efficacy of public health outcomes. Journal of Public Policy.
This paper analyses data from democratic and authoritarian countries with the aim of finding out whether autocratic regimes, using greater stringency measures (policy interventions to tackle COVID-19), had better public health outcomes than their counterparts. The results show that authoritarian regimes performed better in tackling the pandemic in terms of infection and death rates than their counterparts.
Kabeer, N. (2024). Renegotiating Patriarchy: Gender, Agency and the Bangladesh Paradox. London: LSE Press.
In this book, Naila Kabeer explores the unexpected social progress in Bangladesh, particularly for women, despite persistent poverty, weak governance, and rising religious orthodoxy. Termed the "Bangladesh paradox," these advancements are attributed not only to top-down interventions from governments and NGOs but also to the agency of ordinary women. Through everyday actions, these women reshaped deeply entrenched patriarchal norms, enabling social transformation. Kabeer uses extensive qualitative and quantitative research to argue that such grassroots agency has been a driving force in translating institutional policies into tangible societal changes, challenging conventional development theories focused solely on institutional actor.
Kero, M. (2024) Beyond vulnerability: A guidance note on youth, climate, peace and security. The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).
Around 47% of youth aged 18–29 live in countries with extreme or high levels of conflict, and 75% reside in less developed regions. Among them, 250 million are in least developed countries (LDCs), where climate change hits hardest, especially in the Sahel, Horn of Africa, and Central Africa. These areas face overlapping challenges of climate hazards, insecurity, and youth vulnerability. In response, young people are driving efforts in climate mitigation, adaptation, and peacebuilding, reducing resource conflicts, enhancing carbon storage, and promoting sustainable livelihoods. Global youth networks also advocate for disarmament to reduce military emissions and engage in legal actions and activism for policy change. This Guidance Note is the first of its kind to bridge the Climate, Peace, and Security (CPS) and Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) agendas. It highlights youth-led efforts to address climate-related security risks and provides practical guidance for advancing a unified agenda on youth, climate, peace, and security, emphasizing the importance of recognizing and supporting youth’s transformative role.
Least Developed Countries Initiative for Adaptation and Resilience (LIFE-AR) (2024). Demonstrating locally led adaptation principles in practice. International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED).
This report by IIED emphasises the importance of community- driven approaches to climate change adaptation. The report argues that addressing climate change’s diverse effects on ecosystems, communities, and economies is made more complex by the varied nature of climate influences across regions, economies and populations. Climate adaptation solutions must therefore be anchored in local contexts, considering specific vulnerabilities and capacities.
Lewis, B. D. and Dong, S. (2025). The transition to direct mayoral elections in clientelistic environments: Causal public spending and service delivery effects. Journal of Development Economics 172.
This article examines the impact of the transition to direct mayoral elections on district spending and household public service access in Indonesia during a period of momentous national democratic reform. The authors find that the transition to direct elections led to a consistent and large decline in capital spending in both pre- and post-election years. The article concludes that the local democratic transition in Indonesia had a mostly negative impact on key spending and service outcomes, at least in the short-run and for those districts in which clientelistic practices were especially pronounced.
Lowcock, M., and Dissanayake, R., (2024). The Rise and Fall of the Department for International Development. Centre for Global Development.
This book traces DFID’s trajectory from its origins to its unravelling, distilling timely lessons for government aid institutions in the UK and beyond. See Simon Maxwell’s review above for more on the book and what it covers.
McCulloch, N. and Surya, I. R. F. (2024). Electric vehicles in Indonesia: a political economy analysis. The Policy Practice.
This report examines the rapid development of Indonesia's electric vehicle (EV) sector, which leverages the country's extensive nickel resources essential for EV batteries. The authors explore the investments made in nickel mining, processing, and EV manufacturing while addressing critical challenges such as environmental damage, market access limitations, fiscal constraints, and opposition from internal combustion engine manufacturers. The study highlights Indonesia's strategic crossroads: it could emerge as a leader in EV production with external support to address sustainability, policy reform, and international collaboration. Recommendations include boosting infrastructure, mitigating environmental concerns, and creating policies that balance industrial growth with emission reduction goals
OECD. (2024). Pathways Towards Effective Locally Led Development Co-operation: Learning by Example. OECD Publishing.
As more providers commit to support locally led development – whereby local actors have agency in framing, design, delivery, learning and accountability – this peer learning synthesis report provides a comprehensive overview of their efforts and strives to develop a common understanding and definition of locally led development co-operation. Building on existing practices, the report analyses to what extent providers’ systems can enhance or hinder the agency of local actors, looking in particular at policies, financing mechanisms, partnerships, and management processes. Rather than prescribing a singular pathway, it emphasises the importance of context-specific, sequenced, and locally defined approaches. The report is a useful read for policymakers, practitioners and anyone committed to more equitable and effective development co-operation. Click on the links below to access this report’s supporting documents;
-From Global to Local: Multilateral actors and the pivot to locally led development
-Valuing and sharing local knowledge and capacity
-Measuring progress towards locally led development co-operation: Towards a shared framework
Owen, O. and Husaini, S. (2024). The Political Economy of Forest Policy in Nigeria: Changing Trends. Working Paper: The Policy Practice.
This paper examines the evolving dynamics of forest governance in Nigeria. The study highlights a shift from policies influenced primarily by international donors to a growing focus on domestic conservation efforts. Despite challenges such as resource limitations and varying state-level governance approaches—ranging from conservation to unchecked deforestation—the sector benefits from the commitment of professionals. The authors argue that addressing issues like governance capacity and public engagement is more manageable compared to tackling entrenched interests seen in other sectors. The paper advocates for a coordinated effort across global, national, and local levels to achieve a balance between environmental conservation and socio-economic development, offering a pathway for meaningful reform in Nigeria's forestry sector
Rancy, A. (2024). Stronger Together: Coalitions as a catalysts for International Integrity. National Endowment for Democracy.
This report underscores the importance of coalitions that strengthen information integrity, highlighting that they are central to countering authoritarian efforts to manipulate the information space. Such coalitions catalyse the work of diverse prodemocracy voices across sectors—including journalists, fact checkers, narrative researchers, and strategic communicators, among others—and offer important advantages, including: strengthening the foundation of monitor - and -report strategies, creating efficiencies, enabling rapid learning, synergising diverse perspectives and skillsets and elevating communication strategies.
Sampaio, A. (2024). Urbanisation, peace, and security. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime.
This report explores the complex relationship between rapid urban growth, governance challenges, and security in the Global South. The report highlights how unmanaged urbanisation creates vulnerabilities that organised crime exploits, posing significant risks to peace and human rights. With urban populations projected to grow rapidly—especially in low-income countries—weak governance has led to rising violence and insecurity. The study emphasises the need for integrated urban governance strategies that prioritise peacebuilding, security provision, and community resilience. Recommendations include developing national urban security strategies, fostering collaboration among international organisations, and utilising smart technologies to bolster urban safety while ensuring equity and trust. The report serves as a call to action for policymakers to address urban security challenges in an era of unprecedented urban expansion
Sida, L., Proudfoot, P., Cannon, M., Almanza, M., De Vera, M., Tai, M. (2024). Flagship Initiative First Year Learning Report. Institute of Development Studies.
This report reflects on the outcomes and lessons from the first year of the initiative, aimed at fostering innovation and collaboration in addressing complex development challenges. The report emphasizes the importance of adaptive learning and systems thinking, underlining how partnerships across diverse stakeholders and sectors can create impactful and sustainable solutions. It also highlights the challenges encountered, including balancing inclusivity with efficiency and adapting to rapidly changing contexts. These insights are framed within broader themes of equity, resilience, and local capacity building, offering valuable guidance for similar initiatives in global development.
World Bank Group (2024). Pathways out of the Polycrisis: Poverty, Prosperity and Planet Report 2024. World Bank.
This report examines the intersecting challenges of poverty, inequality, and climate change in a post-pandemic world. It highlights stalled progress in poverty reduction, with nearly 44% of the global population living on less than $6.85 per day, and underscores the risks posed by climate-related extreme weather events to vulnerable communities. The report stresses the need for coordinated global actions, including inclusive economic growth, investment in human capital, and equitable climate policies. It calls for balancing trade-offs between poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability, tailored strategies for different income groups, and strengthened international cooperation to bridge development financing gaps.
Williams, D. A. (2024). The Politics of Deforestation and REDD+ in Indonesia - Global Climate Change Mitigation. Routledge Studies in Political Ecology.
This book critically examines Indonesia's experiences with REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) within the broader contexts of neoliberal environmentalism, hyper-capitalism, and carbon politics. Drawing on extensive ethnographic research in Indonesia and Norway, the book explores how international and private financing mechanisms aimed at forest conservation often fail to address the deeper political and economic forces driving deforestation. It highlights how these approaches exacerbate political tensions and overlook the need to couple anti-deforestation strategies with significant reductions in industrial carbon emissions. Furthermore, it links the challenges of implementing REDD+ in Indonesia to the country's democratic regression, suggesting that environmental governance is closely tied to political dynamics. The book underscores that REDD+ cannot substitute for global policies that address industrial emissions, offering a nuanced perspective on the interplay between local governance and global climate goals
2. Blogs, Podcasts and other opinion pieces
Devex (2024). What does Trump’s election mean for global development? This Week in Global Development Podcast.
This podcast examines the implications of Donald Trump’s re-election as U.S. President on global development. The discussion highlights anticipated shifts in U.S. foreign policy, including potential funding cuts to international organisations such as the United Nations and USAID, as well as changes to international climate finance. The podcast also considers how these developments might reshape global leadership dynamics, particularly the opportunities for China to expand its influence. Through expert commentary, the episode delves into the broader consequences for multilateral cooperation and the international financial system under a second Trump administration
Glencorse, B. and Jarvis, M. (2024). The green accountability agenda is a localization agenda. Newsletter in Diplomatic Courier.
Climate Week and the UN General Assembly highlight the need to align climate finance with local needs. The authors write that programmes like Kenya’s FLLoCA show how localizing funds and green accountability can enhance the effectiveness of climate projects.
Robinson, J. Political Economy and development. VoxDev Podcast.
In this episode of the podcast, James A. Robinson (who has just received the Nobel Prize for Economics alongside Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson for their work on institutions) discusses key takeaways from research on political economy, his experiences talking with policymakers, and what he sees as important future research questions in this field. This wide ranging interview covers why now is an exciting time in political economy research, the need for interdisciplinarity, and the importance of focusing on big questions.
Uselman, A. (2004). Leveraging Political Settlement Analyses: Supporting Effective Governance in Colombia’s Green Energy Transition. Blog in USAID’s Learning Lab (17 September).
This blog discusses how applying political economy analysis (PEA) can enhance governance and foster a just green energy transition in Colombia. It examines how integrating local political dynamics and elite interests into decision-making processes can improve policy implementation. The blog also highlights the importance of ensuring inclusivity in governance structures to balance competing interests while advancing sustainable energy goals. This approach emphasises leveraging political settlements to align environmental objectives with equitable socio-economic development outcomes.
Recent events
November 2024: Corruption Measurement 101. This was a three-part virtual discussion series organised by the Anti-Corruption & Governance Centre at CIPE exploring the foundational questions, choices and approaches that underpin corruption measurement.
31 October 2024: Political Economy and Institutional Structure of Data Policy and Governance in Africa: Opportunities, Challenges and Risks. Organised by the African Economic Research Consortium.
31 October 2024: Social Media and Elections: Navigating Disinformation and Free Speech. Panel discussion co-sponsored by The Dialogue’s Rule of Law Program and Luminate as part of an ongoing Elections series.
24 October 2024: CEDCA Panel Discussion: Opposition and resistance to clean energy transition. Panel discussion hosted at IDS as part of the Clean Energy for Development Knowledge Translation Support (CEDCA KT) project to support researchers to better understand the drivers and pitfalls of clean energy transition, and to strategise their approach to inform policy and practice. A Briefing Paper on Resistance to Clean Energy Transitions in Low- and Middle-Income Countries is also available here.
23 October 2024: Building Bridges for Nonviolent Change: The Role of Women as Insider Mediators. Forum hosted by the International Peace Institute and IPI in partnership with the Berghof Foundation.
10 October 2024: Improving the Impact per Dollar of USAID Programming: The Power of Cost-Effectiveness Evidence to Improve Lives. Keynote and panel discussion hosted by the Center for Global Development to launch two USAID policy documents: a Position Paper on Cost-Effectiveness (the first of its kind) and a Position Paper on Direct Monetary Transfers.
3 October 2024: Leveraging AI for Democracy: Civic Innovation on the New Digital Playing Field. Virtual event organised by the International Forum for Democratic Studies and the National Endowment for Democracy.
Resources
The Future of Multiracial Democracy- This special issue of the Journal of Democracy features four leading thinkers as they explore the future of multiracial democracy, and show how democracy must adapt to succeed.
What is Wrong with Democracy? Podcast series on Tortoise, with Ben Ansell. Every week academics, journalists, activists and writers will share their insights on the impact technology, conflict, AI and protest, among other things, are having on democracy.
The Coalitions for (C4R) Reforms Global Partnership. Launched by the Governance Global Practice at the World Bank, this initiative seeks to foster collaboration between various stakeholders, including governments, civil society, the private sector, and international development organisations, to drive systemic reforms in countries around the world. The goal is to promote sustainable development by supporting local efforts to improve governance, transparency, and accountability, particularly in the areas of public sector management and service delivery.
Tell us what you think…we want to hear from you!
Please do not hesitate to get in touch with us for your suggestions and ideas for sections of our newsletter. You can do this via:
- Email: info@twpcommunity.org
- LinkedIn: Thinking and Working Politically Community of Practice- Twitter/X: @TWP_Community
- Bluesky: twpcommunity.bsky.socialOr you can leave a comment clicking in the button below: